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I. Introduction 
This paper examines the environmental implications of the emerging world order of 
development and underdevelopment. In particular, it considers the prospect that the 
environment is being socially shaped and, in a specific sense to be examined below, 
reconstituted by political and economic forces. In our view, what is popularly called 
"environment," more classically "nature," is undergoing a process of social capture which 
eventually may make it a "system" subject to political and economic "laws". Although the 
present energy-environment-development regime is only about 300 years old (dating to the 
* Center for Energy and Urban Policy Research University of Delaware Originall Presented 
at Environmental Planning Institute Seoul National University June 1990. 
** John Byrne is Director of the Center, and Associate Professor, College of Urban Affairs and 
Public Policy. 
,~** Young·Doo Wang is Associate Director of Research for the Center, and Associate Professor, 
College of Urban Affairs and Public Policy. 
**** Kyung-Hee Ham is a Ph. D. Candidate Studying in the Center. 
***** Dr. Jong·Dall Kim current. holds a research position in the Korea Energy Economics 
Institute. 
Drs. John Byrne and Young·Doo Wang and Mr. Kyunghee-Ham are associated with the 
Center for Energy and Urban Policy Research in the College of Urban Affairs and P1.lbli<: 
Policy, University of Delaware. 
The Political Economy of Energy, Environment and Development 279 
spread of a coal-economy, steam technology and wage labor), it appears to have concurrently 
institutionalized a world order of social inequality unknown in previous human history and 
attained a level of technological sophistication that threatens several million years of 
climate, biological and social evolution. An effort is made below to begin construction of a 
theoretical framework for conceiving the social origins of this threat and its implications 
for society and nature. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section reviews 
the political economy of energy, environment and development which has prevailed since 
industrialization. The period is characterized as one of expanding commodification (1) of 
social existence. Nature is seen as successively drawn into the commodification process; 
but, until recently, its role was limited to serving mainly as a resource mine or a reservoir 
for the absorption of industrial waste. Under these conditions, it was analytically feasible 
to focus on the social structure and ignore the possibility that nature was being structurally 
affected. We argue, however, that commodification has spread to the natural structure-
including climate, atmosphere and global temperature-and that conventional distinctions 
between natural and social structures and laws may now be outmoded. Indeed, the dualistic 
treatment of society and nature may represent an impediment to conceiving newly evolving 
relations in the political economy of energy, environment and development. The third 
section explores the meaning and implications of the social appropriation of natural order. (2) 
The paper concludes with a discussion of the links between commodification, the 
appropriation of nature and social inequality. 
II. Industrialization and the Commodification of Society 
The advent of industrialization, first in Europe in the 18th century and then spreading 
(1) "Commodification" is defined as a development orientation pursued by societies in which 
progress is determined by increased social capacities to produce and purchase goods and 
services. Under this orientation, the physical environment is valued either directly, as a 
commodity in the form of energy, raw materials, and resources extracted for social use, 
or indirectly, as a "least-cost" means of disposing of wastes (thereby improving the 
"efficiency" of commodity production and usc). 
(2) By natural order we mean the chemical, biological, and other physical relations that 
constitute and sustain physical existence. Natural laws represent scientific efforts to 
generalize certain of these relations. Similarly, social order refers to political, economic, 
cultural, psychological, and other social relations that constitute and sustain societies, with 
social laws stating in general form certain of these socal relations, In no case that we 
know of are natural laws and natural ordE)r scientifiqalll conceived as contingent upon 
social order and social laws. 
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throughout the world, signalled dramatical change in social relations including those 
between energy, environment and development. Where much of human history had been 
marked by efforts to adapt to the laws of nature and to build societies under the constraints 
set by nature, 18th century's science, technology and enterprise provided new instruments 
for exploiting nature's resources and processes on a scale never before imagined. The 
environmental impact of these new exploitive powers was almost immediately evident, as 
this mid-nineteenth century assessment of industrial life describes: 
Coketown lay shrouded in a haze of its own, which appeared impervious to the sun's rays. 
You only knew the town was there because there could be no such sulky blotch upon the 
prospect without a town. A blur of soot and smoke, now confusedly tending this way, now 
that way ... a dense formless jumble, with sheets of cross light in it, that showed nothing but 
masses of darkness(Charles Dickens, 1854). 
Dickens' nightmare endured into the early part of the 20th century in Europe and the 
U.S., as another writer has observed. Describing the condition of Western cities throughout 
the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, Lewis Mumford had this to say: 
... the change from organized urban handicraft to large scale factory production transformcd 
the industrial towns into dark hives, busily puffing, clanking, screeching, smoking for twelve 
and fourteen hours a day, sometimes going around the clock. The slavish routing of the mincs, 
whose labor was an intentional punishment for criminals, became the normal environment of 
the new industrial worker. None of these towns heeded the old saw, 'All work and no play 
makes Jack a dull boy.' Coketown specialized in producing dull boys. 
Between 1820 and 1900 the destruction and disorder within great cities is like that of a 
battlefield, proportionate to the very extent of their equipment and the strength of the forces 
employed .. .In a greater or lesser degree, every city in the Western World was stamped with the 
archetypal characteristics of Coketown. Industrialism, the main creative force of the nineteenth 
century, produced the most degraded urban environment the world had yet seen; for even the 
quarters of the ruling classes were befouled and overcrowded (Mumford, 1961 :446, 447). 
Industrial cities were important but not unique institutions of an energy-development 
regime which resulted in environmental degradation. Indeed, Mumford invented a term for 
the new regime-Paleotechnicism-by which he meant a social order organized around 
the expenditure of nature's energy capital-its nonrenewable fossil fuel reserves-through 
the use of an allied technology of industrial development. Elsewhere, he referred to the 
regime as "carboniferous capitalism." What was distinctive about the new political economy 
was its alliance of the intellect(through science), the economy(through capitalism), 
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technology (through the advance of Paleotechnics), the power complex (through fossil 
energy combustion) and political life (through the nation state) around an organizing 
principle for society of quantijication(Mumford, 1961: 570; and 1934: 160): 
Quantitative production has become, for our mass-minded contemporaries, the only imperative 
goal: they value quantification without qualification_ In physical energy, in industrial productivity, 
in invention, in knowledge, in population the same vacuous expansions and explosions prevail. 
As these activities increase in volume and in tempo, they move further and further away from 
any humanly desirable objectives ... ln short, numbers begot numbers; and concentration once well 
started, tended to pile up in ever-increasing ratios, claiming increase by inertia where it could 
no longer promise more effective economic performance. 
This alliance produced goods at an unparalleled rate and magnitude, but also pollution 
of a type and scale hitherto unknown: 
The first mark of paleotechnic industry was the pollution of the air. Disregarding Benjamin 
Franklin's happy suggestion that coal smoke, being unburnt carbon, should be utilized a second 
time in the furnace, the new manufacturers erected steam engines and factory chimneys without 
any effort to conserve energy by burning up thoroughly the products of the first combustion; 
nor did they at first attempt to utilize the by-products of the cokeovens or burn up the gases 
produced in the blast-furnace. For all its boasts of improvement, the steam engine was only ten 
per cent efficient: ninety per cent of the heat created escaped in radiation, and a good part of 
the fuel went up the flue. Just as the noisy clank of Watt's original engine was maintained, 
against his own desire to do away with it, as a pleasing mark of power and efficiency, so the 
smoking factory chimney, which polluted the air and wasted energy, whose pall of smoke 
increased the number and thickness of natural fogs and shut off still more sunlight-this emblem 
of a crude, imperfect technics became the boasted symbol of prosperity. And here the concen-
tration of paleotechnic industry added to the evils of the process itself. The pollution and dirt 
of a small iron works situated in the open country could be absorbed or carried away without 
difficulty. When twenty large iron works were grouped together, concentrating their effiuvia and 
their waste-products, a wholesale deterioration of the environment inevitably followed. 
In this paleotechnic world the realities were money, prices, capital, shares: the environment 
itself, like most of human existence, was treated as an abstraction. Air and sunlight, because 
of their deplorable lack of value in exchange, had no reality at all ... the reek of coal was the 
very incense of the new industrialism. A clear sky in an industrial district was the sign of a 
strike or a lockout or an industrial depression(Mumford, 1934:168-169). 
The contents of what Mumford called the "atmospheric sewage" of modern industry 
changed in the 20th century, but the industrial chain of energy combustion-to-environmental 
degradation was not altered: 
The archetypal industrhll town m:ver.theless left deep wounds in the envirQnmt:nt; and some 
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of its worst features have remained in existerce, only superficially improved by neotechnic 
means. Thus the automobile has been polluting the air for more than half a century without 
its engineers making any serious effort to remove the highly toxic carbon monoxide gas from 
its exhaust, though a few breaths of it in pure form art' fatal; nor have they eliminated the 
unburned hydrocarbons which help produce the smog that blankets such a motor-ridden conur-
bation as Los Angeles. So, too, the transportation and highway engineers who have recklessly 
drivcn their multiple-laned expressways into the heart of the city and have provided for mass 
parking lots and garages to store cars, have masterfully repeated and enlarged the worst errors 
of the railroad engineers. Indeed, at the very moment the elevated railroad for public transpor-
tation was being eliminated as a grave nuisance, these forgetful engineers re-installed the same 
kind of obsolete structure for the convenience of the private motor car. Thus much of what 
ap-pears brighly contemporary merely restores the archetypal form of Coketown under a chrome 
plating (Mumford, 1961 :479). 
The alliance of science, the power complex, and the industrial economy ushered in a 
social order of environmental pollution as a functional part of human progress. In effect, 
pollution was normalized. Pollution became for Western industrial societies a mundane 
accompaniment of an existence built upon energy and economic quantification, an existence 
that defined progress as more energy to produce more goods to consume more things, all 
of which piled up the environmental waste. 
A series of pollution spectaculars beginning III the late 1960s exposed the inherent 
problems of quantitative industrialism. One of the most significant, politically, occurred in 
January 1969 when an oil well off the shores of Santa Barbara, California, drilling to a 
depth of nearly 3, 500 feet suffered a "blowout, an uncontrolled eruption" of oil (Easton, 
1972:8). The well was one of 56 slotted in a 3,000ton platform suspended in 188 feet of 
water. The rig was certainly a technological marvel, performing the extraordinary feat of 
balancing pressures in excess of 1, 000 pounds per square inch. However, when pressures 
exceeded 1,100 pounds, the well began spewing mud and oil; rock and sand fissured in 
the geologic formation and oil issued into the ocean waters in miniature geysers. The 
eruption lasted 12 days, creating an oil slick of three million gallons of oil and covering 
an area of 800 square miles(roughly two-thirds the size of the state of Rhode Island). 
Fifty-five miles of coastline were washed with a "black tid" of approximately 1. 3 million 
gallons of oil. The greatest danger occurred along a seven mile stretch of Santa Barbara 
waterfront where 390,000 gallons of crude came ashore. The toll on wildlife was substantial: 
6, 000 to 15, 000 birds died as a result of the blowout, as well as 74 elephant seals and 
five whales (Easton, 1972:257-261). The well WaS eventually capped with a 3,400 foot 
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column of cement but significant seepage from rock and sand fissures caused by the blowout 
continued for several years. Seepage is still occurring today, 21 years after this technological 
accident. Only a late 20th century industrial society could have such an accident. 
The Santa Barbara disaster brought into sharp focus the price of industrial momentum; 
modern society progressed on the basis of a necessary tradeoff of environmental quality 
for increased commodity. In the wake of this disaster, the environment-development tradeoff 
would be extensively questioned. After a week of unchecked seepage, a supervisor for the 
city of Santa Barbara appeared before the u.S. Congress asking that a moratorium on 
offshore drilling in the Santa Barbara Channel be declared. "Gentlemen, we need help and 
protection," the supervisor asserted. But the supervisor and allies of the newly organizing 
environmental movement soon learned that environmental protection was no easy matter 
to produce in an industrial civilization. Industry executives were quick to remind the nation 
of the cost of such protection. The president of Union Oil Company, whose well had 
suffered the blowout, characterized the logic of a drilling moratorium as "like shutting 
down the California education system because there's a riot at San Francisco State 
[University]." While conceding that there was a problm, he urged Congress and the 
American public to keep things in perspective. After all, he noted, no human life had 
been lost; an interruption of oil pumping could hardly be justified because of "the loss of 
a few birds" (New York Times, February 6, 1999). Officials in the oil fraternity came to 
the defense of Union Oil Company. When a U.S. Interior Secretary proposed tightening 
controls on the offshore leasing program, a Gulf Oil official warned against "unwarranted 
protection of the environment" (New York Times, August 3, 1969). 
The U.S. Congress debated the issue for over three years but did not legislate additional 
regulation. A federal court of appeals refused Santa Barbara's request to mandate hearings 
by the U.s. Department of Interior and none was held. In his Congressional testimony, 
an official of the American Petroleum Institute summed up why the natural environment 
could not and should not be a restraint on the technological and industrial environment: 
The nation's real goal should not be preservation ... but proper development and use. The U.S. 
resources are not so vast that we can much afford [the] luxury of dedicating areas to nonuse. 
[Government restrictions on oil exploration] permanently impair the innovative economic process 
whereby many individuals making individual decisions assure the most productive development 
of resources. 
[N]ature flourishes under its benign stewardship: oil derricks stimulate fish to spawn, just as 
road building projects have opened up forage areas and migratory routes for moose. Should, 
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perchance, there be a spill, the ,American Petroleum Institute has studies on spills and beach 
cleanup and it offers literature for the rescue of waterfowl who have been incapacitated. 
(Quoted in Engler, 1977:150) 
The Santa Barbara blowout underscored the commitment of industrial civilization to an 
environment-development tradeoff. Of course, society could go without oil retrieved from 
beneath the sea, or oblige investment in expensive anti-spill technology. But the industrial 
leadership warned that such choices would mean, potentially, surrendering greater economic 
growth. Perhaps more important, failure to take environmental risks could multiply 
problems in other sectors of the industrial system which depends upon smooth operation 
of the power complex. Restrictions on new oil exploration could upset the balance of the 
technological system in activities ranging from transportation and industrial production to 
electricity generation. The American public had learned from this incident just how 
unadaptive the industrial system is; the burden would be on society and the natural 
environment to adapt. 
While politically important, (3) the Santa Barbara "spill" ranks a mere 46th in the 
cavalcade of oil spill spectaculars over the past 20 years. A far larger spill occurred on the 
night of March 23, 1989 when the Exxon Valdez oil tanker ran into a reef in the Alaskan 
Prince William Sound and spilled 37,415 tons of crude. The oil spread to five National 
Wildlife Refuges and three National Park areas, coating an area of more than 900 square 
miles-roughly three-fourths the size of Rhode Island. Hundreds of miles of shoreline were 
washed with a black tide, in some places up to 6 inches deep. The estimated bird kills was 
100,000, including 150 bald eagles. Approximately 1,000 sea otters were also killed. Debris 
from the oil spill was in excess of 100 million pounds; finding a waste repository capable 
of handling this magnitude of garbage proved to be a challenge in itself. (4) Many tanker 
spills could be averted with the requirement of double-hulls for vessels. (5) Yet for 15 years, 
the U.S. Congress has debated the idea without result. The shipping industry is adamantly 
opposed to the idea as "too expensive" (Science, Apr. 7, 1989, p.21), an ironic objection 
(3) Protests in the aftermath of the Santa Barbara blowout were an important stimulus to the 
formation of the U.S. environmental movement and the establishment of the first worldwide 
Earth Day protest one year later. 
(4) There are no incinerators in the region capable of burning the pile of waste generated 
from the cleanup. 
(5) In the case of the Valdez spill, even this might not have prevented the accident. Double 
hulls preserve tanker integrity only for holes smaller than 6 ft.; the Valdez's major rupture 
was 6 ft. by 20 ft. 
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when one considers that the commercial value of the spilled oil in a typical accident is 
$ 40"-'50 million and the cleanup costs(paid by others, usually) are ten to twenty times 
this amount. Exxon dismissed criticism of the accident by referring to the Valdez as 
state-of-the-art in tanker design, built in 1986 as one of the "new, clean variety" (Science, 
1989:21). And, the national government pronounced itself guiltless, despite the fact that 
it had ignored its own analyses on the probability of tanker accidents in this ecologically 
fragile bay. (6) 
The Santa Barbara and Valdez disasters are instructive for their exposure of social 
acquiescence in the industrial orbit to larger and larger scale pollution incidents. Oil spill 
spectaculars are fast becoming recognized as the norm of advanced political economy. While 
public opposition to further oil exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in 
Alaska escalated in the wake of the Exxon Valdez grounding, President Bush(after Valdez), 
representing the reasoning of advanced political economy, bluntly summed up the situation: 
it would be "irresponsible to leave the reservoirs untapped" (Science, 1989:20). The recent 
Persian Gulf War only fortified this belief, leading to a National Energy Strategy which 
calls for opening the Alaskan coaskan coastal plain to oil exploration and the U.S. 
President declaring that a national energy policy which lacks this provision would be 
vetoed. 
Oil spills are only one category of environmental disaster experienced as part of the 
normal operations of contemporary industrial political economy. In addition, there has been 
a ubiquitous tolerance for the rapid destruction of forests. While the Western media 
presently focus on the deforestation of the Southern hemisphere, it is important to recognize 
that the strategic significance of Southern forests is amplified in part by the two-century 
neglect of the problem in the North. What remains of the Northern forests is under 
environmental attack by the energy-based atmospheric wastes of industrialism. Approximately 
35 percent of the U.S. and Europe's forests are succumbing to the airborne battle of 
energy-economic quantification (Table 1). 
Also threatened are the interior waterways of the industrialized territories into which 
are dumped the liquid and solid effiuvia of modern civilization. Waste dumping is undeniably 
obnoxious, but dated in its sophistication. Like coal slag, the dumping of industrial wastes 
(6) A 1972 environmental impact statement prepared by the U.S. Department of the Interior 
on the Valdez Port projected significant spills of one per year, dumping as much as 140,000 
barrels of oil per incident. The Exxon tanker spill was equal to two years of the worst-case 
scenario. Yet, the U.S. imposed no special precautions against the predicted disaster. 
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Table l. Estimated Forest Damage in Europe: 1988 
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1. For areas where only conifers were surveyed, "total forest area" means total forested area 
of conifers. For Yugoslavia, which conducted only a regional survey, "total forest area" 
means total area surveyed. 
2. Conifers only. In Ireland, only trees less that 60 years old were assessed. 
3. Includes unsurveyed portions of countries that have done regional and conifer-only 
surveys. 
4. Does not include Turkey or any of the Soviet Union except for Estonia and Lithuania. 
Source: Worldwatch Institute, based on U.N. Environmental Program and U.N. Economic 
Commission for Europe, "Forest Damage and Air Pollution: Report of the Hl88 Forest 
Damage Swvey in Europe," Global Environment Monitoring System, 1989. 
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in streams, rivers and lakes is a product of old-fashioned technology. The manufacture of 
"acid rain" is the more modern and insidious technique for fouling waters. The important 
elements of acid deposition-sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides-are transformed chemically 
in the atmosphere and fall to earth as acidic rain, snow, fog or dry particles. Damage to 
aquatic resources, estuaries and costal waters, timber and recreational resources, buildings 
and public health are the result. 
In wide expanses of eastern North America and northern and central Europe, the pH of 
rain and snow averages between 4 and 4. 5. Compared to a pH in the range of 5. 6 in 
preindustrial times, recent precipitation in many industrial regions is 10"-'30 times more 
acidic(7) (Postel, 1984:18). Examples of the devastation wrought by this pollutant source 
are given in Table 2. Losses of this magnitude can hardly go unnoticed; social acceptance 
of them as ordinary is essential to their persistence. Much of this acidic pollution is 
traceable to the energy appetite of industrial civilization. Sixty-five percent of the sulfur 
dioxide emissions in the U.S., for example, is generated by power plants, which also 








Table 2. Evidence of Acidified Lakes, Selected Countries 
Evidence 
------------------- -
More than 14, 000 lakes strongly acidified, and 150, 000 in the East(one in 
seven) suffering biological damage. 
Survey of 1, 000 lakes indicates that those with a low acid-neutralizing 
capacity are distributed across the country; 8 percent of these lakes have 
no neutralizing capacity; most strongly acidified ones are located in 
southern Finland. 
Fish eliminated in waters covering 13, 000 square kilometers and otherwise 
affected in waters over a further 20, 000 square kilometers. 
14,000 lakes unable to support sensitive aquatic life and 2, 200 nearly lifeless. 
Some acidified lakes in southwestern Scotland, western Wales, and the 
Lake District. 
About 1,000 acidified lakes and 3,000 marginally acidic ones, according to 
the Environmental Defense Fund; a 1984 government study found 552 
strongly acidic lakes and 964 marginally acidic ones. 
Sources: Jim Ketcham-Colwill, "Acid Rain: Science and Control Issues," Environmental and 
Energy Study Institute Special Report, July 12, 1989; U.N. Economic Commission for 
Europe, "Current Geographical Extent of Acidification in Rivers, Lakes, and Reservoirs 
in the ECE Region"(draft), June 15, 1988. 
(7) The pH scale, commonly used to express acidity, ranges from a to 14, with anything less 
than 7 considered acidic. The scale is logarithmic, and therefore, a decrease of two units 
means a lOa-fold increase in acidity. 
(8) Energy for transportation produces another 41 percent of the U.S. NOx total-see MacKenzie, 
1987). 
Table 3. Import·Export of Sulfur Pollution in Selected European Countries: 19881 
C j T t I E 
. . 2 I T -t I D '~t' - -I 'Share of EmiSSionslshare of Deposition 
ountry 0 a miSSIOn 0 a epOSl IOn Exported3 Imported 
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(thousand tons) (percent) 



























181 74 91 
302 69 89 
65 81 89 
104 80 72 
622 67 59 
628 63 59 
659 75 47 
1, 248 68 46 
3,201 61 38 
510 72 36 
787 75 22 
590 72 22 
636 71 15 
Notes: 1. Sulfur is generally emitted as sulfur dioxide but may fall to earth as a variety of its 
chemical derivatives, including sulfuric acid and sulfates. 
2. Unless otherwise noted, emissions figures are preliminary 1988 data. Data of Austria, 
Sweden, and France are for 1987; Italy, 1986; and Spain, 1983. 
3." May be deposited either in another country or over a body of water. 
4. Only the European part of the Soviet Union; thus export figure includes exports to the 
Asian part of the Soviet Union. 
Sources:, World watch Institute, based on emissions data in Economic Commission for Europe, 
"Annual Review of Strategies and Policies for Air Pollution Abatement" (draft), 
September 26, 1989; and transboundary flows data supplied by the European Monitoring 
and Evaluation Program. 
An added feature of the air-transported acids of industrialism is the capacity to transfer 
the environmental consequences of economic activity to distant communities. As shown in 
Table 3, a thriving import-export market has emerged on the European continent for 
trading acid pollution, underscoring the triumph of industrialism over Old World politics. 
Invasion via the environment is now an acceptable political· economic strategy in the 
contemporary order. 
Human health is not exempt in the industrial degradation of nature. As the air is fouled 
with technological and economic advance, 20th century cities, like their 19th century 
counterparts, are affiicted with the worst pollution. Residents of virtually all of the world's 
large urban centers breathe air unfit for human health (Figure 1). Pollution circulating 
through a technologically·manufactured worldwide urban cloud of chemical waste(most of 
it energy-based) exacts the price of industrial existence-life threatened by the involuntary, 










Sources: World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 
1987. Global Pollution and Health; Center for Energy and Urban Policy Research, 
University of Delaware. 
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Figure 1. Summary of the Annual S02 Averages in Selected GEMS/Air Cities: 1980"-'1984 
heretofore life-giving, act of breathing. Chronic bronchial, lung, circulatory and heart 
problems are the special mark of industrial civilization (French, 1990). 
That the pollution of the environment and the human frame is directly tied to industrial 






Source: Jameg J !\bcKenzie 198Q Breatiring Easier' Taking .4.eflon OT 
Climate Change, Air }JolJuliun. and Energy SULJntj. 
Figure 2. U.S. Sources of Carbon Dioxide 
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motorized transport in the modern order, and each of these technologies is responsible for 
major shares of the chemical waste cloud found, increasingly, throughout the world. 
Advanced industrialization only ensures greater magnitudes of the problem and deeper 
dependence on technological advances to solve it. Reliance for economic growth on 
improvements in transportation and electricity (as has the u.s. political economy, for 
example, throughout this century) promises higher carbon emissions which will exacerbate 
problems of urban smog and acid rain(Figures 2 and 3). The only other alternative to 
















Power plants are the largest source of 
sulfur pollution and the second largest 
source of nitrogen oxides. Vehicles are 
the largest source of nitrogen oxides 
and organic compounds. 
Source: James J. MacKenzie. 1989. Breathing Easier: Taking Action or 
Climate Change, Air Pollution, and Energy Security. 
Figure 3. Sources of Precursors of Ozone and Acid Deposition 
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nuclear power (taken up below). In this context, modern society is increasingly found to 
be struggling with itself: a captive of the environmental problems that it is uniquely 
capable in all of social history of creating; and a captive of the technological solutions 
which, once employed. invariably breed new, more difficult social and environmental 
problems. 
III. Toward a Structural Analysis ~9) 
Three hundred years of industrialization have rendered social and ecological reiations(lO) 
largely commodity-based. Human existence transpires within a reality of production and 
consumption of commodities which together release into the air and water and deposit on 
plants and the soil pollutants more numerous than we probably know and, certainly, more 
complex in their effects than we understand. This reality is structured and motivated by 
the logics of technological advance and capital accumulation. Environmental consequences 
are, at best, a residual concern. We depend for our lives and our experience of life upon 
a collective capacity to produce goods and services and services and upon individual 
capacities to obtain and consume goods and services, as though nature was incidental to 
the human drama. As Mumford argued, society has become a "megamachine" with its 
members existing as so many machine parts. In the technological milieu, natural experience 
has all but evaporated except as a "recreational good." 
There have been concerted efforts to develop social analyses which can both characterize 
the commodification process and challenge its hegemony over social and ecological relations. 
But even the most comprehensive social frameworks conceive only the possibility of social 
activities which degrade the environment. In every social theory of which we aware, the 
rules or laws of nature are understood to operate literally outside the laws of social 
motion. Structural transformation of the environment is presumed by prevailing social theory 
to be beyond the reach of social influence. Social behaviors are conceived as limited in their 
(9) "Structure" is used in this paper to refer to physical or social relations that provide 
regularity and continuity to certain phenomena. Thus, physical relations, which continuously 
regulate the surface temperature of the earth, are a natural structure; and social relations, 
which underpin a development orientation that routinely treats the physical environment 
as a commodity, are a social structure. 
(10) Social relations refers here to individual and collective relations among human beings; 
while ecological relations refers to the interaction of humanity with all other forms of life 
and with the natural order as a whole. 
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impacts to the disruption or degradation of "environmental quality." Left intact is the 
distinction between society and nature as phenomenal structures. 
Natural inquiry likewise observes an analytic boundary between the two spheres. The 
influence of human beings on natural and physical operations is recognized in the paradigms 
of biology, chemistry and physics. But the architectures of social and natural order are 
understood as maintained by relations and rules which are distinct to each sphere. In this 
respect, natural inquiry, like its social counterpart, operates on a premise of dual realities-
one social and one natural. 
Implicit in the dual-realities premise, from a social point of the view, is the assumption 
of the permanence of nature, particulary as a reservoir for social wastes. It is presumed 
that virtually anything can be socially practiced and repeated with the principal environ-
mental consequences being a natural disturbance or degradation of environmental quality. 
To speak about environmental "spillover effects," "externalities" and "social costs," it is 
essential to the very logic of the language in which these ideas are conceived that one 
can reliably believe in the natural reservoir as, in effect, bottomless; and that the problems 
of environmental disruption or degradation, eventually, can be internalized within the 
social structure. This does not preclude social catastrophe-the starvation of large 
populations, the spread of epidemics, annihilation of societies or even the human species-
but, ultimately, such disasters are confined to their social sphere. The permanence of a 
natural reservoir is not ob via ted or negated by human disasters. 
The natural point of view is similarly predicated on nature's analytic autonomy. Only 
with this characteristic, can nature provide the grounds, literally, for validation/falsification 
of the supposed rules and laws of natural order, the epistemological centerpiece of this 
mode of inquiry. We cannot think naturally, physically, about order within the reigning 
paradigms without, at the every least, assuming a distinct order for nature. Indeed, for 
most practitioners of natural inquiry, a hierarchy of orders is implied between the natural 
and the social, with the former setting, broadly, the conditions and constraints for actions 
in the latter. 
From either perspective, behaviors of one domain can penetrate the other and produce 
change, but only at the behavioral level. Social behaviors do not redesign nature; and 
natural behaviors do not redesign society. 
However, a range of environmental issues point to the difficulty of maintaining the 
assumption of a dual reality-one natural and one social-at the structural level. Indeed, 
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the very meanings of "structure" and "behavior" are challenged by these issues. The rapid 
and widening decomposition of stratospheric ozone at the polar caps during certain times 
of the year, and the documented changes in the chemical composition of the earth's 
atmosphere which portend a rise in the planet's surface temperature, certainly constitute 
structural phenomena from the point of view of natural and physical inquiry. Yet, they 
are perplexing because the source of the chemical restructuring of nature appears to be in 
the practices (behaviors) of the other sphere, the social structure. While as noted above, 
the possibility of behaviors of one structure affecting the other is not in itself surprising, 
an interaction between the two realities which might induce restructuring of the other's 
domain is theoretically arresting! Such a prospect defies the analytic boundaries upon which 
social and natural inquiry operate. 
For our purposes, the most important scenario for analyzing the possible breakdown of 
a dual reality of society and nature is that the commodification process has functionally 
spread to the architecture of nature itself. (lj) In this scenario, the potential for social 
activity to affect its own natural context (12) may be great enough to redesign nature. This 
potential is in part an outgrowth or legacy of social behaviors under the structural 
guidance of industrial capital; and in part a result of the achievements of certain scientific 
and technological practices. Under the scenario we are proposing for study, the forces of 
technology and capital are not limited to acts of natural disturbance or degradation. 
Rather, the very structure of nature is subjected to the design principles of these social 
forces. The contrast would be between capital-and technology-guided decisions to endanger 
the health of workers and whole communities by pollution practices at various industrial 
sites(which enhance profit, market position, etc.); and the collected practices of technolo-
gical societies which in toto valorize a particular atmospheric chemistry (specifically, one 
richer in CO2). The difference is fundamental. In the former case, a social structure-
advanced industrial society-guides behaviors which adversely impact nature at the 
ell) To date, commodification would seem to impinge specifically on the chemistry of the 
atmosphere. Other components of the natural architecture are not, as yet, speculated to be 
affected. 
(12) The term "contcxt" is carefully chosen. It is ordinary that social activities can affect social 
structure utterly, to the point where a new structure displaces an earlier one (this is true 
in nature also); thus, the passage from feudalism to capitalism. While such things may be 
historically extraordinary/rare, they are by no means unique or exceptional from a 
structural-analysis perspective. Frequently, social theorists employ the word "environment" 
to mean the same thing as "context" here, but for obvious reasons it would be better to 
have the meaning of "environment" restricted to the one developed in this paper. 
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behavioral level: air, water and human tissue are poisoned to some degree. But the natural 
order which produces air, water and living matter is not itself altered; the effect of the 
pollution is too idiosyncratic to restructure nature. In the latter example, the social 
structure threatens to cause a different natural order to evolve. 
Below we offer an interpretation of energy, environment and development relations that 
conceives commodification as having breached the nature-society duality and is now 
encroaching on the structural organization of nature itself. This prospect lies beyond the 
theoretically possible for social and physical analysis as presently organized. Apparently, 
however, it is not outside the reality of advanced political economy. In the following 
section, two examples of the commodification of the natural structure is explored: the 
spread of nuclear technology and the prospect of global warming. 
IV. The Commodification of Nature 
Human beings and their technological, economic and political systems produce behaviors 
within an energy-development-environment regime. Recent evidence indicates that the whole 
effect of these behaviors and systems is greater than the sum of their parts. The utilization 
of nuclear power technology is one important example. An accident in the operation of 
this technology has the potential of destroying the means of natural life over a large 
geographic area for thousands, and even tens of thousands, of years. The wastes generated 
by normal operation of this technology potentially pose a similar scale of threat to life. 
The military applications of this technology intensify and magnify the threat, bringing 
into clear view the capacity of nuclear systems to jeopardize the conditions of social and 
natural life. Similarly, the greenhouse effect portends a restructuring of the environment 
which, as Dr. Nicholas Shackleton, a climatologist at Cambridge University has suggested, 
means "we are going outside what nature has experienced in the recent past 500,000 years" 
(New York Times, January 16, 1990). These cases will be used to explore the thesis 
that nature is being transformed by the social process of commodification. 
1. Nuclear Power 
The arrival of nuclear energy heralded the supersession of autonomous nature experience 
by technological society. With knowledge of nuclear fission, the human race acquired the 
permanent capacity to destroy the basis of life on earth (Schell, 1982). This capacity 
renders obsolete nature as we have' tmditionally known it. No society can escape the threat 
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--------- -------------- -- ------- ----- ---- -------------------------------
of nuclear annihilation, but must depend upon the mutual decisions of the community of 
nations to forego use of certain applications of atomic knowledge. Equally, though, the 
future of much of non·human life depends upon social decisions/actions. Natural order in 
this specific sense can be affected by social institutions organized to promote and regulate 
the use of nuclear energy. 
It is not simply nuclear weapons that thrust society into the forefront. As was learned 
in the Chernobyl accident, civilian applications (131 pose a sizable threat too. While the 
damage from the explosion at Plant No.4 was mostly regional, nearly 400 million people 
in 15 nations were put at risk of radiation exposure; and forecasts range from 5,000 to 
75, 000 additional cancer deaths as a result of the accident. Yet, the immediate consequences 
of the accident are only part of the issue; an even more serious question is raised by its 
aftermath. As shown in Table 4, traces of iodine-I31 and cesium-I37 in milk throughout 
Table 4. Maximum Reported Radiation Levels in Europe after Chernobyll 
--- - -
Ground Iodine-131 in Milk I Cesium-137 
Country Exposure I National Safety 
Rate Reported I Guideline in Milk 
(micro· (Becquerels/ 
Roentgen/hour) litre) 
Soviet Union2 15,000 - 2,000 -
Poland 1,000 2,000 1,000 -
Sweden 500 2,900 2,000 44 
Romania 350 2,900 185 10 
Austria 240 1,500 370 -
Czechoslovakia 200 1,000 1,000 llO 
West Germany 200 1,184 500 300 
Switzerland 150 1, 850 3,700 629 
Yugoslavia 150 1, 000 - 380 
Turkey 100 360 - -
United Kingdom 100 1,136 2,000 443 
Italy - 6,000 500 230 
-
Notes: 1. Measured April 29 to May 13, 1986, except for Czech, Italian, and Yugoslavian Cs-137 
data, measured early June. 
2. Soviet figure for edge of evacuated zone. Levels would have been higher closer to the 
plant. 
Source: World Health Organization, "Summary Review of Measurement Results Relevant for 
Dose Assessment, Update Revision No.7", Copenhagen, 1986. 
(13) Amory Lovins and colleagues in a classic paper, "Nuclear Power and Nuclear bombs" 
(1980) challenge the distinction between weapons and power plants on several grounds; 
and Joseph Camilleri (1984) has offered historical support for this position. It is not feasible 
to take up this issue here. 
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Europe underscore the enormously hazardous risks associated with the use of nuclear 
reactions to produce electricity. And it must be recognized that the gases, and their 
components, released in the accident are the same as those to be found in a safely operating 
reactor. The rubble at the Chernobyl site is dangerous to human health and natural habitat 
for tens of thousands of years; but so are the interior surfaces of the containment vessels 
of nuclear plants retired after decades of successful, accident-free operation. Indeed, the 
rubble is no different in the long-term risk it poses than the waste products generated from 
the normal operation of a nuclear plant. 
In this respect, nuclear technology and the accidents that can accompany its use are 
catastrophe-prone. For this reason alone, nuclear energy can never be like any other 
technology. It requires, as an inherent condition of its use, that protective social institutions 
are constructed to shield society and nature from the potentially disastrous effects of this 
technology'S accidents and successful use. These institutions have operated outside the 
mainstream of civil society, dominated by scientific experts and the military. Further, these 
institutions must last longer than any in the human record. Indeed, management of the 
nuclear waste stream requires 1, 000 year nuclear security zones and 100,000 year surveillance 
mechanisms (Weinberg, 1979:94-95; Anderson et al., 1980:30). Alvin Weinberg, one of the 
architects of the U.S. nuclear program, captured the point in his now-famous Faustian 
metaphor: 
We nuclear people have made a Faustian bargain with society. On the one hand, we offer-
in the catalytic burner--an inexhaustible source of energy ... But the price that we demand of 
society ... is both a vigilance and a longevity of our social institutions ... In a way, all of this 
was anticipated during the old debates over nuclear weapons ... In exchange for atomic peace, we 
have had to manage and control nuclear weapons ... [WJe have established a military priesthood 
which guards against inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, which maintains ... a precarious balance 
between readiness to go to war and vigilance against human errors that would precipitate war ... 
[PJeaceful nuclear energy probably will make demands of the same sort on our society, and 
possibly of even longer duration. 
In this analysis, Weinberg mixes the histories of nuclear bombs and plants because, in 
the end, they represent the same challenge-to devise authoritarian social institutions which 
secure the technology from realizing its catastrophic character in normal operation. Only 
5ucce3sful social management can prevent the social and natural order from utter destruction_ 
The origin and spread of nuclear energy is traceable to the deeply rooted industrial belief 
that energy is an essential facet of progress-that, as Lovins derisively depicted it, "the 
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more energy we use, the better off we arc" (1977:4). Western pursuit of this ideal brought 
into being political economies of extraordinarily high energy intensity. Indeed, an ideology 
of high energy consumption appears so ingrained in the Western psyche that one writer 
was prompted to label it the "energy-civilization equation," a pervasive if often implicit 
assumption that over the past 300 years high and growing energy consumption was 
responsible not only for improvement in physical comfort, economic well-being, and military 
strength, but for social, moral and intellectual achievements as well-in short, for the 
progress of civilization (Basalla, 1980: 40). 
Nuclear energy was, and continues to be, promoted as the ideal "abundant energy 
machine" (Byrne and Rich, 1986). Economic justification was irrelevant to its initial 
promotion. Nuclear power was not the invention of enterprise; there was no market demand 
for it; and there was no economic supply of it prior to its institutionalization. As an 
energy source, nuclear power was not technologically available and could not be demonstrated 
when the U.S. undertook its development. An institutional framework for promoting nuclear 
power was initiated with the Manhattan Project, which brought together three of the most 
powerful institutions in American society-the military, large industry and technoscience-
to create nuclear bombs. This apparatus was then authorized in 1946 by the U.S. Congress 
to deliver the peaceful atom, eleven years before the idea could be technologically expressed 
and seventeen years before the successful demonstration of the first turn-key plant. In 
effect, the society set about to discover and affirm the advantages of nuclear power and to 
discount its costs without any knowledge of its economic practicality and before the 
technical means to deliver it existed. The social desirability and technical viability of 
nuclear power were evaluated in the context of its active promotion and not the other 
way around(Byrne and Rich, 1986:153). 
Nuclear power was, and continues to be, a technological "fix" to the fundamentally 
unsustainable ideal of industrial progress. Rapid depletion of fossil resources merely amplifies 
the social "need" for the technology. In fact, nuclear advocates often cite the shrinking 
availability of fossil fuels as an important reason for supporting nuclear technology 
development. For example, an official of the U.S. Department of Energy agreed recently 
that "nuclear is the only non-fossil energy source that will be available to us in sufficient 
amounts to support our current civilization and to fuel progress for the foreseeable future" 
(Agnew, 1983:1). In the wake of Chernobyl, enthusiasm continues, especially in the Third 
World, for the technology. It is seen as ally in the race for development in a world of 
diminished natural resources. In reality, this appeal presently serves the needs of a moribund 
nuclear power industry. Alvin Weinberg also anticipated a concerted effort to sell nuclear 
power to the poor: 
The amount of [nuclear] energy ... is truly enormous: enough to last mankind on any reasonable 
energy budget for many millions of years! Thus the development of the breeder would provide 
man with ... reasonably cheap energy, essentially forever. What emerges is the outline of an 
autarkic world ... in which the primary energy source, based on the breeder reactor ... is available 
to all countries, not only to countries that possess indigenous fossil fuel, or are rich enough to 
import such a fuel from others. (1971 :416) 
Third W orId users of the technology will deepen their dependence on the West as the 
capital requirements to purchase plants will typically leave them in debt to the banks of 
the industrialized countries; waste disposal problems will lead to reliance on Western 
expertise; and the need to obtain fuel will force them to enter into contracts with the 
selected few countries who can provide it. 
Continued spread of the technology will increase the frequency of accidents and enlarge 
the stockpile of long-lived, toxic waste, bringing into sharp focus the hegemony of 
commodity values over life·affirming ones. All but lost in this scramble are the alternatives 
of reduced energy use, resource conservation and resource sharing. Yet, in the current 
world political economy such options evoke the apocalyptic visions, not nuclear power: 
We foresee a doomed civilization with tractors paralyzed in the fields, abandoned automobiles 
rusting on weed·choked freeways, factories as quiet as tombs, and our haggard descendants 
facing a life of everlasting drudgery ... A retreat from rising energy consumption under those 
circumstances means far more than the minor discomfort of living in a warmer house in the 
summer and a cooler one in the winter, or driving a smaller car less frequently and more 
slowly. As less energy is available per capita the nation is thought to lose its standing among 
the world's civilizations (Basalla, 1980:39, 40). 
It is precisely the ideology of abundance which, if not abandoned, may thrust the world 
into social and natural calamity. Indeed, a restructuring of the international political 
economy on the principle of energy conservation could well be OUf best hope of avoiding 
social and natural disaster. 
2. Global Warming 
Nuclear technology threatens the natural order with the prospect of sudden catastrophes 
triggered by the release of highly toxic, long-lived wastes manufactured in the atomic 
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Table 5. Greenhouse Gases 
~~~_~=c=~c~~-~-=o_~-,-- ~o=-I-- -~~---~=- ~Cc-;;~:n~rati;~-i-;=;~;=~~O====O~l---~=-=;::;~;t--~~o= 
Gas ---------- Rate of Increase 
Pre-Industrial I 1986 (per year) 
~:t~::e~i~~~e(C02)----- --- - O~~:::: --- /:~::: ,1---- \ ~:::~o. ~=; 
Fluorocarbon-12(CCbF2) Zero 400ppt 19ppt ( 5%) 
Fluorocarbon-1l(CCI3F) Zero 230ppt llppt ( 5%) 
Nitrous Oxide(N20) 280ppb 305ppb 0.6ppb (0.2%) 
Ozone, Tropospheric(03) 15ppb 35ppb 0.3ppb ( 1%) 
Northern Hemisphere 
Other Fluorocarbons Zero I 
Only 
(5 to 15%) 
* ppm==parts per million, ppb=parts per billion, ppt=parts per trillion 
* Source: Ralph Cicerone, "Global Warming, Acid Rain, and Ozone Depletion" in Dean E. 
Abrahamson(ed.). 1989. The Challenge of Global Warming. Washington D.C.: Island 
Press.) 
Table 6. Major Greenhouse Gases and Their Characteristics 
-----~~-~----
I Atmospheric i Annual Relative Current Principal 
Gas C . I Life Span Greenhouse Greenhouse Sources I oncentratlOn, Increase Efficiency Contribution of Gas 
(ppm) (percent) (years) (C02==1) (Percent) 
Carbon 
Dioxide 351. 3 0.4 X* 57 
(Fossil Fuels) (44) Coal, Oil, 
Natural Gas, 
(Biological) (13) Deforestation 








Nitrous Oxide 0.31 0.2 150 230 6 Fossil Fuels, 
Fertilizers, 
Deforesta tion 
* Carbon dioxide is a stable molecule with a 2"-'4 year average residence time in the atmosphere. 
Sources: Worldwatch Institute, based on various sources including, U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, Policy Options for Stabilizing Global Climate Change (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1989, draft); V. Ramanathan et aI., 
"Trace Gas Trends and Their Potential Role in Climate Change," Journal of 
Geophysical Research, June 20, 1985; James Hansen et aI., "Greenhouse Effect of 
Chlorofluorocarbons and Other Trace Gases," Journal of Geophysical Research, 
November 20, 1989. 
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reaction . Socially induced global warming augers a different type of natural transformation. 
First, it is caused by the steady buildup of mostly non ·toxic gases over the Ii fe of 
industrialization. In addition, it represent s an insidious process of social disruption of the 
natural order, rather than a sudden, ca tastrophic rupture as in the case of unclear power. 
As Table 5 indicates, the pr incipal "greenhouse" gases- C02, N20, 0 3 , CH4 and CFCs-
have continuously concentrated in the atmosphere since the pre· industrial period. The 
primary source of these gases is foss il· fuel combustion, which accounts for nearly one-half 
of the CO~ increase and is an important source of h igher N20 (Table G) . If we sum across 
soc ia l activities, nearly 60 percent of worldwide greenhouse emissions are associated with 
energy production and use (Figure 4), Greenhouse theory hypothesizes that an atmosphere 
composed of high concentra tions of these gases will result in higher surface temperatures. 
Data on global mean temperatures over the past J 00 years of worldwide industrialization 
indicate that the pla net is warming (Figure 5) . Although the precise magn itude and 
physical dynamics of the greenhouse eff ect remain the subject of much debate, a scientific 
consensus appears to have formed on its existence (Fla vi n, 1989 : 15-16; COSEPUP, 1991) . 
Indisputably structural in character, the greenhouse effec t includes not only the prospect 
of higher temperatures, bu t changes in sea level and the distribution and loca tion of dry 
and wet land areas, as well as the alteration of a host of other biologica l and climatological 




Ag ri ru lillrol 
Pr ~c l ices 
(1·' <; 1 
Source: DJ.niel A. Loshof ~nd Dcnn is A. Tirp~k (ed .). Policy Op:ions /o r Slabili:ing 
Globnl Climnli ." n rnfl RepOriln Conp,rPS<. U.S. Envi ronm'nl~1 Prolocl lOn 
Agency. F, bnmy \~~'l . 
Figure 4. Activities Con tributing To Globa l Warming 
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Sources: James E. Hansen et a!.. "Reg:onal Greenhouse Climate Effects," in John 
Topping, ed.~ Coping with Climate Change (Washington, D.C.: The 
Climate Institute, 1989); (as reproduced in Christopher Flavin, Slowing 
Global Wamling: A Worldwide Strategy, Worldwatch Paper 91,1989). 




processes .. Heretofore, climate changes of these kinds were determined by the confluence of 
three astronomical cycles which regulate the earth's orbital ellipse, axial tilt and wobble. 
The orbit cycle which fixes the earth's travel within the solar system takes approximately 
100,000 years to complete the series of elliptical modifications involved; the tilt cycle lasts 
about 41, 000 years and completes a series of axial corrections; and the elapse of the wobble 
cycle is nearly 23, 000 years. Together, these cycles control the timing of global warming 
and cooling by altering the angles and distances from which solar energy reaches the earth. 
These very long· lived cycles must be placed alongside the 300 years of industrialization 
(with the last 100 years representing, by far, the most carbon-intensive), which are 
cumulatively believed to have begun a social process of temperature change, to appreciate 
the magnitude of social interference. The time disjuncture in these terms of reference points 
to the immense capacity assembling in the world political economy to threaten nature. 
Even skeptics of the present status of the greenhouse effect should be awed by the potential 
for social engineering to change the natural structure, which, if not available presently, 
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almost certainly will soon be. The carbon buildup that has accompanied industrialization 
is a testament to the systematic imposition of commodity values on the society-nature 
relation. It is the environmental expression of energy-economic quantification. The depth 
to which commodified nature is presumed by the existing social order can be exemplified 
by considering how the carbon dependence of modern development might be slowed or 
reversed. 
In a series of scenario analyses for a u.s. Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) report 
on Policy Options for Stabilizing Global Climate(Lashof and Tirpak, 1989), some 
indication of the carbon dependency of the world political economy is given. Using a 110-
year planning horizon, the EPA study first sought to identify global carbon-reduction 
strategies which might stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gases at a concentration which 
assumes a 1. 5"-'2. OCo increase in global average temperature. That is, the first scenario 
assumed that global warming is inevitable, but that we can hope to place a ceiling on the 
magnitude of warming. Introducing policy options iteratively into the climate change model 
used for the project, the researchers discovered that single, or even limited numbers of, 
policy steps could achieve chemical stability. Rather, eleven major initiatives would be 
needed which ranged from a phaseout of CFCs use by the year 2003; a major reforestation 
effort worldwide; adoption of a series of energy-efficiency improvements including the 
achievement of a global fleet-average auto fuel efficiency of 50 miles per gallon (mpg) ; and 
government-sponsored speedup of the commercialization of solar technologies. Even with 
these substantial responses implemented, the study relied upon increased nuclear power 
production (14) to meet the goal of a warming commitment of 1. 5"-'2. OCO(Lashof and 
Tirpak, 29"-'45 and, especially, Figure 8). 
A second simulation defined the objective as no additional warming beyond the year 
2000. Again, policy planning was stretched over the period from the present to 2100. The 
conclusion of this analysis was that it would be necessary to implement all strategies in 
the atmospheric chemical stabilization scenario, and eight additional policy responses. High 
carbon emission fees would have to be imposed on the production of fossil fuels in 
proportion to CO2 emissions potential; and an excise tax on fossil fuel use would need to 
be enacted for the industrialized countries. Separate auto fuel efficiency standards would be 
(14) Although, to rationalize the technology's promotion, it was necessary to assume annual 
O. 5% decreases in construction costs, something the world has yet to experience in 40 years 
of operation of the industry. 
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imposed which require 50mpg fleet averages by 2000 and 65mpg by 2025. And, deforestation 
would have to be halted worldwide by 2000, and reforestation efforts doubled over the 
stability scenario(Lashof and Tirpak, 1989:29-45 and, especially, Figure 9). 
These above analyses of nuclear power and global warming are intended to illustrate the 
structural implications of 300 years of commodification on the natural order. They suggest 
that industrial societies are pursuing a development path that will eventually alter natural 
structures. Indeed, it oppose that the momentum for commodification of nature is so strong 
as to require unheard of global cooperation merely to moderate its effects. To begin to 
undo the commodification of the nature, global cooperation will not be enough-steps toward 
the restructuring of industrial societies appear necessary, including an abandonment of the 
abundant energy ideal and commodity-based industrialism. In sum, removal of the prospect 
of restructuring nature depends upon structural action in the social sphere. Nature and 
society are now structurally related. 
V. Conclusion: Commodification of Nature and Global Inequality 
The argument developed here is that contemporary energy-environment-development 
relations commit us to a form of world political economy in which nuclear catastrophe and 
global warming are implicitly accepted as the necessary risks of progress. Advanced 
technology and chemistry, in conjunction with an energy appetite based on an unsustainable 
ideology of abundance, have created a machine world with the capacity to directly alter 
the cycles and processes of nature. Whereas the initial stages of carboniferous capitalism 
tested the statics of nature, namely, the absorption capacities of land, water and air; the 
advanced industrial order of global capital and markets challenges the dynamics of nature, 
in particular, the seasons, the tides, the breathing of the planet, and even the reproductive 
cycle of the atmosphere. While the emblems of advanced industrialism, like carboniferous 
capitalism, remain waste and pollution, there has been a fundamental breach of the 
nature-society relation. Advanced industrial life transpires not simply outside the ~nstraints 
C,' 
of nature, but relegates nature to commodity status, to be purchased and sold in the world 
political economy along with other products and services. The contemporary world political 
economy presumes that sustainability is a technological and economic matter. Although this 
presumption is most concretdy presented in discussions of trade-offs between environmental 
protection and material progress, its deeper implication is the demise of the idea of nature's 
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sustainability. There is nothing in advanced industrial logic beyond technological 
manipulation; not the climate, not the atmosphere, not species diversity. Nature is stripped 
altogether of autonomous status. 
In this context, the manufacture of acid rain and holes in the upper ozone, the extinction 
of plant and animal species(and the engineering of new ones), the reduction of the planet's 
capacity to breathe(due to deforestation, among other things), the manufacture of highly 
toxic, long-lived poisons which are so dangerous that they require 1,000 year security 
zones, and the creation and satisfaction of consumptive appetites which in their aggregate 
portend a change in global climate-all have become rational and efficient. The debate over 
global warming and the possible need to restrict world carbon dioxide emissions is illus-
trative of the advanced industrial mind. In a recent article in the New York Times 
(November 19, 1989), Harvard economist Thomas Schelling points out that, "both the 
will and technological ability to adapt to radically different weather [has changed rapidly J. 
In 1860 two percent of Americans lived outside temperate or subtropical zones. By 1980 
the percentage had increased to 22 percent." Schelling further argues that "the appealing 
idea of bequeathing the biosphere intact seems arbitrary. The quality of life in 100 years ... 
will depend as much or more on the endowment of technology and capital as on the 
percentage of carbon dioxide in the air. And if money to contain carbon emissions comes 
out of other investments, future civilizations could be the losers." Citing a study by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency which estimates the cost of protecting American 
coastal cities from a three-foot sea rise at $ 73 to $ 111 billion, the article notes that is 
"a lot of money but not so much compared with the likely cost of prevention." The 
reporter concludes from interviews with Schelling and other economists and technologists 
for the article that an analytical consensus is emerging: "it may be cheapest to deal with 
the effects of global warming rather than the causes." 
Schelling's argument repeats premises of the quantitative ideology which have produced 
the threats of global warming and nuclear catastrophe: measuring environmental and social 
debacle in the numeraire of "costs" and "benefits" at the margin; assuming that the value 
of life to future generations is less than the technological conveniences to present 
"consumers;" treating the health of the poor as a negotiable commodity to be traded for 
the comfort-desires of the rich; in sum, regarding the issues of development and environment 
as an endless series of tradeoffs. The argument encourages view of society and nature as 
forms of technology and capital that can be manipulated to productive effect! In this logic, 
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there is no brake on commodification. and efforts to construct one are vigorously rejected 
as anti-progressive. Yet, because human existence outside earth's atmosphere is technolo-
gically conceivable and, under certain institutional circumstances, perhaps, economically 
rational, hardly justifies the destruction of the basis of life on earth as we have known it. 
Moreover, for the industrialized countries to heed Schelling's advice and confine their 
attention to the "cheapest" strategy of coping with the effects of technological accidents 
and climate change is t6 disregard the central role of the industrial system in creating the 
problem. The industrialized countries are, by far, the largest polluters in the world system. 
Total and per capita carbon emissions are much higher for those countries than for the 
poor countries of the South (Table 7). Likewise, cumulative contributions to the carbon 
buildup which forebodes global warming are largely the responsibility of the industrialized 
countries (Fig. 6). And, the industrialized world is the primary source of all other 
Table 7. Carbon Emissions from Fossil Fuels. Selected Countries 1960 and 1987 
Carbon 
Country 
Carbon per Dollar GNP Carbon per Capita 
1960 1987 1960 1987 1960 1987 
(milli on tons) (grams) (tons) 
United States 791 1,224 420 276 4.38 5.03 
Canada 52 110 373 247 2.89 4.24 
Australia 24 65 334 320 2.33 4.00 
U.S.S.R. 396 1,035 416 436 1.85 3.68 
Saudi Arabia 1 45 41 565 0.18 3.60 
Poland 55 128 470 492 1. 86 3.38 
West Germany 149 182 410 223 2.68 2.98 
United Kingdom 161 156 430 224 3.05 2. 73 
Japan 64 251 219 156 0.69 2.12 
Italy 30 102 118 147 0.60 1. 78 
France 75 95 290 133 1. 64 1. 70 
South Korea 3 44 274 374 0.14 1.14 
Mexico 15 80 446 609 0.39 0.96 
China 215 594 - 2,024 0.33 0.56 
Egypt 4 21 688 801 0.17 0.41 
Brazil 13 53 228 170 0.17 0.38 
India 33 151 388 655 0.08 0.19 
Indonesia ·6 28 337 403 0.06 0.16 
Nigeria 1 9 78 359 0.02 0.09 
Zaire 1 1 - 183 0.04 0.03 
World 2,547 5,599 I 411 I 327 I 0.82 I 1. 08 




Sources: Oak Ridge N:ltiol1al l,ahor.ltory; Worldwrltch Institute. 
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Source: United NatIOns Envlronment Programme. 1987. 
The Slate of the World Em'irollment. 
Figure 7. Total World Emissions of Common Air Pollutants from Human 
Activities in 1980 
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greenhouse gases, lagging the rest of the world only in the release of dust into the air 
(Fig. 7). In this circumstance, the concentration of national efforts in the industrialized 
orbit on the economical(to them) strategy of combatting the effects rather than the causes 
of global warming is tantamount to demanding international acceptance of the long-standing 
inequality of responsibility in the degradation of nature. The industrialized world's 





• Sum of Iraq, Kuwai~ Iran, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia 
•• Two countries, Japan and the USA, use more than a quru,er of world oil production; 
and two countncs, the USSR and Saud! ArabIa, provide Just under a quarter of world oil 
exports. 
Coal (million tons) 
~~-----------~ 
16.8 
Sources: UN, Yearbook of World Ellergy Statistics; RP; CIA, World Oil Market (as produced in 
Th~ New Stalt of the World Atlas, 1987) 
Figure 8. International Movement of Oil and Coal: 1984 
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commitment to commodification deprived the South of its right to choose the appropriate 
relation of society with nature. At the very least, the industrialized countries owe the South 
the opportunity now to decide their relation with nature without further damage from the 
(in) actions of the North. 
As the principal source of global environmental and technological threat, the existing 
world political economy of inequality and its corresponding development regime of 
commodified nature cannot be assumed as the structural context for 'designing rational, 
efficient or feasible solutions. Burden sharing, emissipns trading and related proposals, when 
contemplated within the current institutional framework, can all too easily become forms 
of industrial escape from problems the industrialized countries have caused (and benefiitted 
by). Instead of an exploitive politics of efficiency, industrial efforts should be guided by 
principles of equality and ecological balance in restructuring their social relations of energy, 
environment and development. This specifically requires a redistribution of economic and 
technological capacity sufficient to end the underdevelopment of the South and to redirect 
world development along as ecologically balanced, equitable path. 
Indeed, it would be irresponsible for the industrialized orbit to choose the "cheaper" 
strategy when only they have this option available. The poor countries cannot afford the 
consequences of a decision by the rich to wait and see. As the beneficiaries of a structure 
of worldwide inequality in energy supply (Fig. 8), industrial capacity (Fig. 9), capital (Fig. 
10), and purchasing power(Fig. 11), these countries' have enjoyed the material fruits of 
commodification at the expense of the world commons. Addressing only the effects of 300 
years of commodification destines the poor to remain poor. Unless conditions of global 
inequality are changed, the poor will be forced to adopt development choices whi~h largely 
imitate the energy-intensive economies of the industrialized group. After all, ,the borrowed 
, ... ~ '~,! t 
capital, transferred technology and traded commodity which dominate transact~ons between 
rich and poor will continue to be the product of energy-intensive economics. But the spiral 
of commodified nature deepens with each addition of imitators. This is why, as Durning 
has observed, the environmental crisis and the crisis of unequal development must be solved 
together. They are, structurally, the same proble.tp(Durning, 1989:67): 
Over the long run, fossil use in industrial countries may be the most important determinant 
of the global poverty rate. Every year that passes without an international accord to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in effect dooms millions more to live as paupers. Conversely, insofar 
as deforestation contributes to global warming, and poverty to deforestation, poverty alleviation 
has a place in any comprehensive climate protection plan. 
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Figure 11. International Distribution of Purchasing Power : 1984"-'1985 
Until now, alternative paths of energy, environment and development have been opposed 
by the industrialized countries, leaving economic imitation or isolation as the practical 
realities of Third World choice. In this ci rcumstance, the Third World's future is held 
hostage by the twin forces of unequal development and environmental degradation. It is in 
the common interest of these soc ieties to break free of the spiral of poverty by restructuring 
not only their economic relations with the already industrialized, but their energy and 
environmental relations, as well. It is in the interest of all who desire a peaceful, democratic 
fut ure to demand responsible action by the industrialized countries to correct the problems 
they ha ve created. Finally, it is in the common interest of li fe on earth for human 
prosperity to be realized through sustainable development, as called for in the report of 
the World Commission of Environment and Development (1987), rather than environmental 
and social commodification. 
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